Judicial politics has emerged as a central feature of the multilateral trading system alongside a steep decline in the World Trade Organization’s ability to deliver negotiated trade liberalization.
This book advances innovative arguments and presents original evidence to shed light on the important and surprisingly under-researched question of whether, and how, judicial politics has affected the prospects for cooperation in the WTO through multilateral trade rounds.
'This excellent book presents an original account of judicial politics in the WTO. The authors demonstrate persuasively that the strengthening of enforcement in the WTO has had important consequences for the domestic politics of trade in member countries. For its thoughtful arguments and rich empirical basis, this book deserves to become a key reference in the literature on judicial politics in international relations.
Andreas Dür, University of Salzburg
'This volume on the political economy of the judicial process in the realm of trade liberalisation makes a meaningful contribution to the literature on the subject. The authors have already made their mark through joint and individual works on this score. In this volume, they take their thinking one step further, inquiring into the manner in which adjudication of disputes can be a catalyst for agreements in the WTO. This thought-provoking book is a must-read for all theoreticians and practitioners in the field of international trade.'
Petros C Mavroidis, Columbia Law School
'Poletti and De Bièvre investigate in this book the fascinating nexus between the judicial arm of the World Trade Organization and its rule-making capacities. They offer a novel and nuanced argument by fully integrating domestic interest group dynamics into their theory. Their book further presents a number of highly insightful case studies to tease out the projected linkages. This book is a must-read for students of IPE and those interested in understanding the true (and underappreciated) effects of judicial systems in global economic governance.'
Manfred Elsig, World Trade Institute, University of Bern